Transnational Non-Judicial Divorces: A Comparative Analysis of Recognition under English and U.S. Jurisprudence by Reed, Alan
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
2-1-1996
Transnational Non-Judicial Divorces: A
Comparative Analysis of Recognition under
English and U.S. Jurisprudence
Alan Reed
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan Reed, Transnational Non-Judicial Divorces: A Comparative Analysis of Recognition under English and U.S. Jurisprudence, 18 Loy. L.A.
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 311 (1996).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol18/iss2/3
Transnational Non-Judicial Divorces: A
Comparative Analysis of Recognition
Under English and U.S. Jurisprudence
ALAN REED*
I. INTRODUCrION
Under U.S. law, dissolution of the marital res is predicated on
state jurisdiction established through domcile.' The fundamental
premise is that divorce constitutes a civil judicial process. Diver-
gent procedures for the acquisition of divorce, however, exist from
country to country. This issue becomes important when courts
must determine the validity and effect of divorces that persons in
England and the United States acquire by procedures alien to
those forums. Of special interest is what recogmtion courts give to
the atypical, non-judicial, religious divorces that Jewish and Islamic
law authorize.
This Article highlights the current egregious treatment given
under Anglo-American law to transnational divorces. It analyzes
the problem through a comparative approach to illustrate the
contumelious disregard of the Jewish and Muslim cultures. Part II
examines U.S. case law to illustrate the disparity between recognlz-
* M.A., Cambridge University, 1988 (with honors); Recipient of the Holland
Scholarship Award; L.L.M., University of Virginia, 1990; Faculty of Law, University of
Leeds. I wish to thank the University of Louisville and especially the members of the
faculty of law for their collegiality and hospitality during my summer research visit of 1995.
1. The concept that divorce is dependent upon domicile within the territorial
jurisdiction is known as the lex domicilii principle. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
domicile of the plaintiff suffices for divorce jurisdiction over an ex parte application.
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). In an ex parte divorce, only the plaintiff
is actually before the court. In inter partes proceedings, both parties participate before the
court. Under English law, however, the position is governed by the Domicile and
Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973, ch. 45, § 5(2) (Eng.), by which both domicile and
habitual residence for one year constitute jurisdictional touchstones. The basis is not
simply domicile but also habitual residence. For dissolution see Clifford Hall, Cruse v.
Chitum: Habitual Residence Judicially Explored, 24 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1 (1975); Paul
Beaumont, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: Forum Non Conventens, 36 INT'L &
CoMP L.Q. 116 (1987).
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ing non-judicial divorces obtained outside the forum and not
recognizing non-judicial divorces obtained within the forum. Part
III concentrates on the effect of transnational proceedings in non-
judicial divorces, particularly in light of English statutes govermng
the recogntion of divorces. Part IV discusses the various policy
considerations involved in the recogmtion of non-judicial divorces.
Part V concludes that an urgent need exists for statutory legislation
to rectify the current lacuna that denies recogmtion to all
transnational divorces where- an element in the process occurs in
England or.the Umted States.
II. RECOGNIZING NON-JUDICIAL DIVORCES IN ENGLAND AND
THE UNrrED STATES
Both English and U.S. law recognize non-judicial divorces that
donucilianes of foreign countries obtain within their countries and
that lex domicilii2 recognizes as legally dissolving the marrage.3
The recogmtion afforded non-judicial divorces that foreign
domicilianes obtain outside the forum is in stark contrast to the
lack of recognition given divorces where the forum is the place of
origin of the actual divorce. The Umted States denies recognition
to religious, non-judicial divorces that U.S. residents obtain within
the United States.4 Similarly, in England, statutes regulate divorce
and only competent courts of civil jurisdiction may grant them.5
This dichotomy is best illustrated by comparing two U.S. cases,
Kapigian v. Der Minassian, involving a non-judicial divorce
2. Lex domicilii is defined as "the law of the domicile." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
911 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Machransky v. Machransky, 166 N.E. 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1927) (involving a
Russian rabbinical divorce); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 442 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1981)
(recognizing a 1979 Israeli decree granting the husband, a New York resident, a divorce
in accordance with rabbinical law where an order of the Israeli court was junsdictionally
well-founded, free from the taint of fraud, and did not contravene New York public policy);
Sherif v. Sherif, 352 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Far. Ct. 1974) (recognizing Egyptian divorce where
both husband and wife were Egyptian nationals). English law accords recognition pursuant
to the Family Law Act of 1986.
4. Shikoh v. Murff, 257 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1958).
5. Family Law Act, 1986, ch. 55, § 44(1) (Eng.), which governs this matter, states:
"[n]o divorce obtained in any part of the British Islands shall be regarded as effective
inany part of the United Kingdom unless granted by a court of civil jurisdiction." Divorce
is viewed as entirely a matter of civil competence, denying recogmtion to any form of non-
judicial divorce, religious or by custom. Id.
6. 99 N.E. 264 (Mass. 1912).
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obtained outside the Umted States, and Shikoh v. Murff,7 involv-
ing a non-judicial divorce obtained within the United States.
A. Recognition of Non-Judicial Divorces Obtained. Outside the
Forum
Kapigian v. Der Minassian involved an interesting Turkish
divorce process! The respondent married his first wife in Turkey,
in a Christian ceremony, while domiciled in Turkey. The couple
imtially practiced Chnstiamty. The wife subsequently renounced
Christianity, professed Mohammedism, and then married a
Mohammedan. Under Turkish law, such a renunciation of
Christiamty automatically rendered her Christian marriage null and
void. The respondent established a new domicile in Massachusetts,
where, relying on Turkish law, he married the petitioner. The
petitioner subsequently sought a decree of nullity, claimng the
prior Turkish divorce was invalid. The court rejected the nullity
decree and recognized the Turkish divorce. The court found the
Turkish form of divorce immaterial and not repugnant to public
policy. Because both parties to the respondent's first marriage
were Turkish domiciliaries at the time of the Turkish annulment,
the court held their marital status subject to Turkish jurisdiction.9
This case illustrates the willingness of U.S. courts to recognize
foreign divorces, even when they are non-judicial m form.
U.S. courts recognize religious divorces that foreign
domcilianes validly obtain abroad, based on principles of lex
domicilii and international comity." Recognmtion of such divorces
is entirely appropriate. For U.S. courts to umversally apply their
7. 257 F.2d 306 (1958).
8. 99 N.E. 264 (Mass. 1912).
9. Id.
10. See Note, United States Recognition of Foreign, Non-Judicial Divorces, 53 MINN.
L. REV 612, 618-19 (1989), stating:
[n]o logical justification can be advanced for denying recognition to nonjudicial
divorces simply because the method is repugnant to the forum. The basis of the
lex domciii doctrine is to acknowledge changes of status valid by the law of the
divorced parties' domiciles; thus the inquiry into the foreign law should be limited
to ascertaining that the divorce is legally binding under that law. By questioning
further into the nature and merit of the foreign methods of divorce, American
courts would be passing judgment, by American standards, on the foreign law,
and disregarding the sovereignty of the foreign nation over its domicilianes.
The principle of comity "is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to
laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but
out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
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own peculiar domestic standards to deny recognition to religious
divorces is inimical to international comity and subversive of
reciprocity among countries." The disastrous consequence of
non-recognition creates limping marriages-a mamage validly
dissolved in one jurisdiction but not m another.
B. Recognition of Non-Judicial Divorces Obtained Within the
Forum
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached a different
result in Shikoh v. Murff12 The petitioner was a male Pakistani
national, studying in New York, who attempted to divorce his wife
by writing a declaration of divorce signed by the spiritual head and
national director of the Islamic Mission of America. The
petitioner's wife remained domiciled in Pakistan throughout the
process. This declaration effectively ended the marriage under the
laws of Islam, and the wife received a copy of the declaration in
Pakistan. 3 The Second Circuit determined the declaration of
divorce invalid, and not a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning
of New York's constitutional provision that prohibits the grant of
a divorce other than by judicial proceedings.'4 In essence, the
court applied the principle of territorial jurisdiction and held that
divorce proceedings must follow New York law to be valid within
the state. 5 The United States recognizes, foreign divorce decrees
between persons domiciled abroad because of requirements of
international comity. The United States, however, does not
recognize divorces obtained in New York between persons not
domiciled in New York. 6
The United States has created a dichotomy by not recognizing
'non-judicial divorces actually obtained within the United States
contrary to a judicial process requirement, yet recognizing non-
judicial divorces where, although the parties are physically present
within the United States, a foreign official in a foreign jurisdiction
of domicile granted the divorce. 7 New York appellate courts
11. Note, supra note 10, at 619-20.
12. 257 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1958).
13. l at 307.
14. Id. at 309. The New York Constitution provides, in part: "[n]or shall any-divorce
be granted otherwise than by due judicial proceedings." NY. CONsT. art. 1, § 9.
15. Shikoh v. Murff, 257 F.2d at 309.
16. Id.
17. Note, supra note 10, at 628-31, 634-36.
[Vol. 18:311314
Transnatonal Non-Judicial Divorces
upheld divorce decrees issued m this latter scenario in a trio of
Danish Royal decree cases.I" In each of these cases, Denmark
issued the decrees to the Damsh Consulate m New York! 9
Unlike the situation m Shikoh v. Murff, the divorces properly
originated from the foreign country and the foreign official in New
York was not the divorcing authority.20 A divorce procured
within the forum by non-judicial means is wholly invalid both in
England and the Umted States. This invalidity is predicated on
territorial sovereignty over divorce cases, which forms a fundamen-
tal premise for conflicts rules in both countries.
C. The Importance of Non-Judicial Divorces
1. The Jewish Get Procedure
It is not surprising that the validity of a religious, non-judicial
divorce in Shikoh arose in the state of New York. That particular
forum is home to diverse religious communities embracing, among
others, the Jewish and Islamic faiths. The difficulties of non-
judicial transnational divorces under these religions represent the
focus of this Article. Certainly, the Jewish divorce by get, contrary
to secular civil divorce m New York, raises great controversy and
has been the subject of academic literature."
The Jewish divorce by get requires formal delivery to the wife
of the get document.22 Securing a get is vital for Jewish couples
18. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 220 N.Y.S. 242 (App. Div. 1924); Hansen v. Hansen, 8
N.Y.S.2d 655 (App. Div. 1938), rev'g 3 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Weil v. Weil, 26
N.Y.S.2d 467 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
19. Sorenson, 220 N.Y.S. at 242; Hansen, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 655; Weil, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
20. Sorenson, 220 N.Y.S. at 242; Hansen, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 655; Weil, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
21. See generally Lawrence M. Warmflash, The New York Approach to Enforcing
Religious Marriage Contracts: From Avitzur to the Get Statute, 50 BROOK. L. REV 228
(1984); Edward S. Nadel, New York Get Laws: A Constitutional Analysis, 27 CoLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 55 (1993); Marc Feldman, Jewish Women and Secular Courts: Helping a
Jewish Woman Obtain a Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 139 (1989); Tamna Rostain,
Permissible Accommodations of Religiorn Reconsidering the New York Get Statute, 96 YALE
LJ. 1147 (1987).
22. The word get is the arabic translation of the Hebrew word meaning "bill of
divorce." See Feldman, supra note 21, at 139. The availability of a religious divorce has
its roots m a Biblical verse in Deuteronomy that states: "When a man takes a wife and
marries her, if it then comes to pass that she finds no favour m his eyes for he has found
something unseemly in her, he shall write her a document of divorce and give it to her
hand and send her out of his house." Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah. A Study
in Halacha, Contract and- the First Amendment, 51 MD.'L. REV. 312, 313 n.2. (1992)
(translating Deuteronomy 24:1).
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because both orthodox and conservative Judaism require a
religious divorce in addition to a civil divorce.' A woman whose
husband leaves her and refuses to give her a get is known as an
agunah, and according to ,Jewish law she remains married to her
husband and cannot, remarry. If an agunah remarries, the
religion regards any children to that second marrage as illegiti-
mate s The social ostracism is palpable.
A husband may capnciously deny a get as a bargaining
device.26 A disreputable husband can force his wife to accept a
disadvantageous financial settlement by threatening denal of the
get.27 This type of economic coercion results from the inequalities
between the parties.2 To some extent, New York case law29 and
23. See generally Feldman, supra note 21, at 139.
24. Id.
25. l
26. See Breitowitz, supra note 22, at 395. Note that Professor Breitowitz stated,
The unwilling spouse's claim that the get law violates his free exercise rights is
further refuted in the vast majority of cases, where his refusal to give a get is not
motivated by religious beliefs, but out of spite, or as a means of obtaining
valuable concessions. Indeed, it is precisely because the husband knows that a get
is needed that he is able to use it as a bargaining chip. The withholding of a civil
divorce where the failure to give a get is not religiously based is certainly not a
First Amendment violation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
27. Nadel, supra note 21, at 68.
28. See Pert v. Pert, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372 .(App. Div. 1987) (voiding unfair property
settlement because coercion was exerted by the husband); Golding v. Golding, 581
N.Y.S.2d 4 (App. Div. 1992) (voiding unfair separation agreement because coercion was
exerted by the husband). In both of these cases.'the courts have clearly demonstrated an
increased willingness to void unfair property settlements and separation agreements
obtained by husbands in exchange for the delivery of a get.
29. See -Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983). The Court of
Appeals' decision in this case exemplifies the problem for Jewish women and creates a
limited remedy. The parties mramed in 1966 m accordance with Jewish law and tradition.
Prior to the marriage ceremony they signed a ketubah, which stated that in the
circumstance of marital problems, the aggrieved spouse had the right to summon the other
party to appear before a Beth Din. The husband obtained a civil divorce in 1978, and the
wife sought an appearance before the Beth Din to achieve a get. The refusal of the
husband to comply was held by the court to-give rise to a civil suit for specific perfor-
mance. Secular terms of the parties' binding prenuptial agreement to arbitrate any post-
marital religious obligations before a specified rabbinical tribunal, which was entered into
as part of a religious ceremony, were enforceable. The Court of Appeals then decided the
case solely upon the application of neutral principles of contract law, without reference to
any religious principle. Consequently, the defendant's objections to the enforcement of his
promise to appear before the Beth Din, based as they were upon the religious origin of the
agreement, posed no constitutional bamer to the relief sought by the plaintiff. I&
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statutory reform3 ° remedy the egregious position of the wife m
such a scenario.
The above analysis highlights the importance of forum
recognition of Jewish divorces by get. Both England and the
United States recognize non-judicial divorces obtained m foreign
countries, while denying recogmtion where procured territorially
within the forum and contrary to judicial process. Such divorces
typically occur transnationally when a party writes the formal get
document m New York or London but delivers the document to
the wife in Israel. Consequently, this Article addresses vital issues
such as the recognition of such decrees, applicable policy consider-
ations, and the relevance of equitable principles and rationality.
2. The Islamic Talaq Procedure
According to ancient Islamic law, a husband's pronunciation
of the word "talaq"' three times Immediately dissolves a marriage
between Muslims.32 This form of talaq, known as a bare talaq, is
immediately effective and does not require notification to the
wife.33  Both Kashmur and Dubai still adopt a bare talaq.'
Pakistan, however, no longer recognizes a bare talaq as effective by
itself to dissolve a mamage."
30. Because the Avitzur decision was narrowly construed, the difficulties incumbent on
the wife over get acquisition remained laYgely unresolved. In an attempt to rectify the
problem the New York Legislature amended the Domestic Relations law by adding § 253
entitled, "Removal of Barriers to Remarriage." N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 253 (McKinney
1986). Under this so-called "get statute," the state will not enter a final divorce judgment
until a petitioner, whose marriage was solemnized by a clergyman, submits a verified
statement that he or she has removed any "barrer to remarriage" that is "solely within his
or her power to remove." Id. § 253(4). A "barrer to remarriage" is defined to include
"any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition imposed on a party to a marriage,
under the principles held by the clergyman [sic] or minister who has solemnized the
mamage, by reason of the other party's commission or withholding of any voluntary act."
d § 253(6). The result is that, under § 253, a Jewish husband whose wife wants a get may
not be able to procure i civil dissolution of the marriage without first initiating a religious
divorce via the get process.
31. The talaq divorce in classic Muslim Sunni law dissolves the marriage through the
oral pronouncement by the husband of 'talaq, talaq, talaq," literally translated as "I divorce
you, I divorce you, I divorce you." Zaal v. Zaal, [1983] 4 F.L.R. 284, 287.
32. Bernard Berkovits, Transnatnonal Divorces: The Fatima Decision, 104 L.Q. REV.
60, 62 (1988) [hereinafter Transnational Divorces].
33. Once pronounced, the talaq is irrevocable and takes effect immediately. The wife
does not have to be present and there is no formal necessity for any witnesses to be
present. See Zaal, [1983] 4 F.L.R. at 287 (Justice Bush).
34. Transnational Divorces, supra note 32, at 63.
35. Id
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In 1961, Pakistan enacted the Muslim Family Laws Ordi-
nance.3 6 Section 7(1) of the Ordinance placed a fetter on the
right of a husband to dissolve a marriage in this manner by
introducing four requirements for a talaq to be effective.37 These
requirements are: (1) the husband must pronounce the talaq either
orally (unlike the get) or in writing; (2) the chairman of the
relevant local union council in Pakistan must receive notice of the
talaq; (3) the wife must receive a copy of the notice; and (4) ninety
days must expire following the delivery of the notice to the
chairman." The punishment for noncompliance can be either
imprisonment for up to one year or a fine of 5000 rupees ($146.10
USD).39 The crimnal penalties consequently prohibit the basic
talaq procedure and supplant it with the state determined ordi-
nance talaq.
III. THE EFFECT OF TRANSNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS IN
RECOGNIZING NON-JUDICIAL DIVORCES
English law has considered, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, the
question of recognizing non-judicial transnational divorces. U.S.
jurisprudence, however, contains few precedents." This Article,
therefore, concentrates on the English experience, including a
review of ithe statutory and common law developments. Ultimate-
ly, English and U.S. case law illustrate that the inexorable current
trend is in breach of international conuty. Finally, the Article
proposes equitable policy grounds as the basis for urgently needed
reforms. The underlying premise is that courts more effectively
adjudicate family law problems, not through strict adherence to
established legal principles but by amving at a just and socially
desirable result.
4'
A. English Law Prior to 1986
English common law prior to 1971 recognized an overseas
divorce, provided that the parties obtained the divorce in an
overseas country in which they had a real and substantial connec-
36. Id., see also Quresht v. Qureshi, 1972 Faro. 173.
37. Transnational Divorces, supra note 32, at 63.
38. Id.
39. WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at C21.
40. A rare exception is Chertok v. Chertok, 203 N.Y.S. 163 (App. Div. 1924). See infra
part III.D.
41. See Note, supra note 10, at 620.
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tion.42 Using the real and substantial cnterion, the House of
Lords held that the parties' overseas divorce was valid in Indyka
v. Indyka.43 The problem witi using such a test as a judicial basis
is the uncertainty of the standard.
In 1971, England codified the recognition of foreign divorce
decrees in the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations
Act." This Act gave effect m England to the provisions of the
Hague Convention, applying a jurisdictional basis such as
nationality, domicile, or habitual residence7 as a prelirmnary filter
for recognition.45 The recognition of foreign nullity decrees
remained uncodified, but following Law Commission recommenda-
tions,46 nullity recognition rules became aligned with the divorce
recogltion rules. These Law Commission recommendations alsoI g
contained proposals to improve the divorce recognition rules and
suggested enacting the new rules in a single code.47 Tus code is
now set out m Part II of the Family Law Act of 1986, sections 44-
55."' The Family; Law Act, which replaced earlier statutes,
contains a recognition mechanism that applies to all overseas
divorces wherever obtained.49
B. England's Family Law Act of 1986
The underlying philosophy contained in Part II of the Family
42. Indyka v. Indyka, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 33 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
43. Id. at 34-35.
44. Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971, ch. 53 (Eng.).
45. Id., see also Convention on Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (Hague
XVIII), June 1, 1970, 1975 U.K.T.S. 123 (Cmnd. 6248) (jurisdictional basis from habitual
residence, nationality, or domicile of either spouse in the country in which the divorce was
obtained). Article 17 of the Convention left contracting states at liberty to apply rules of
law more favorable than those required by the Convention. Id. art. 17. Parties to the
Convention include Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. M.J. BOWMAN & D.J. HARRIS,
MULTILATERAL TREATIES 338 (1984).
46. LAW COMMISSION AND ScoTrlSH LAW COMMISSION, No. 137,1984, CMND. 9341
at 46 (report on the Recognition of Foreign Nullity Decrees and Related Matters); see also
M.P Pilkington, Transnational Divorces Under the Family Law Act 1986,37 INT'L & COMP
L.Q. 131, 132 (1988).
47. LAW COMMISSION AND ScOTIsH LAW COMMISSION, No. 137, 1984, CMND. 9341
at 45.
48. Family Law Act, supra note 5, §§ 44-55.
49. Family Law Act, supra note 5. This replaced the Recognition of Divorces and
Legal Separation Act, 1971. Pilkington, supra note 46, at 132.
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50Law Act provides a jurisdictional basis for divorce recogmtion.
The law no longer differentiates between non-judicial divorces
obtained outside and within the jurisdiction. Rather, the Family
Law Act draws a fundamental distinction between overseas
divorces that. are "obtained by means of proceedings," judicial or
otherwise, and overseas divorces that are "obtained otherwise than
by means of proceedings. ' ,51 The distinction is of great signifi-
cance because the jurisdictional basis of recogmtion is now much
wider for recognizing divorces obtained by proceedings. In the
case of divorce "proceedings," section 46 provides that:
(1) The validity of an overseas divorce, annulment or legal
separation obtained by means of proceedings shall be recognised
if-
(a) the divorce, annulment or legal separation is effective
under the law of the country in which it was obtained; and
(b) at the relevant date either party to the marrage-
(i) was habitually resident in the country in which the
divorce, annulment or legal separation was obtained; or
(ii) was domiciled m that country; or
(iii) was a national of that country.
(3) In this section 'the relevant date' means-
(a) in the case of an overseas divorce, annulment or legal
separation obtained by means of proceedings; the date of
the commencement of the proceedings 52
Thus, England recognizes overseas divorces by means of
proceedings if the divorce is effective under the foreign law, and if
either party was a national, domiciliary, or habitual resident in the
foreign state. Domicile is the touchstone for limiting the jurisdic-
tional basis of the non-proceeding divorce, contained in section
46(2):
The validity of an overseas divorce, annulment or legal
separation obtained otherwise than by means of proceedings
shall be recognised if-
(a) the divorce, annulment, or legal separation is effective
under the law of the country in which it was obtained;
(b) at the relevant date-
50. The act received the Royal Assent on November 7, 1986. Family Law Act, supra
note 5.
51. Family Law Act, supra note 5, § 46(i), (2).
52. Id. § 46.
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(i) each party to the mamage was domiciled m that
country; or
(ii) either party to the marriage was domiciled m that
country and the other party was domiciled m a country
under whose law the divorce, annulment, or legal
separation is recogmsed as valid; and
(c) neither party to the marriage was habitually resident in
the Umted Kingdom throughout the period of one year
immediately preceding that date. 3
Additionally, the requirement that neither party habitually resided
in the United Kingdom for one year preceding the divorce serves
as an anti-evasion criterion for non-proceeding divorces.-"
In essence, the jurisdictional requirements operate as a filter
to deny or allow recogmtion. The statute distinguishes between
proceeding and non-proceeding divorces, but -unfortunately
provides no defimtion of the term "proceedings." Some suggest
the phrase is limited to cases involving some act external to the
parties themselves, such as registration, conciliation proceedings, or
some other form of approval. 5
Non-judicial divorces raise two distinct questions of
interpretation over the Family Law Act of 1986.6 First, in the
context of a Jewish divorce, is whether a Jewish get represents a -
divorce obtained by proceedings, judicial or otherwise. This issue
has an impact on the junsdictional touchstones. Second, and more
important, is in which country should judicial determination find
the divorce has been "obtained."'57 This issue is vital because
section 44 of the Family Law Act of 1986 provides that no divorce
obtained in the British Islands is effective in any part of the United
Kingdom unless granted by a competent court of civil jurisdic-
tion.58
53. Id. § 46(2).
54. In this regard, the Family Law Act of 1986 did not follow the Law Commission's
liberal recommendations to assimilate divorces obtained other than by proceedings with
those obtained by proceedings.
55. P.M. NORTH & JJ. FAWCETr, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 669 (12th ed. 1992).
56. Family Law Act, supra note 5, § 46; see Berkovits v. Gnnberg, [19951 2 All E.R.
681 (Fain. Div.).
57. Family Law Act, supra note 5.
58. Id § 44. This latter question replicated the dilemma the U.S. court faced in Shikoh
v. Murff, 257 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1958). Recall that the parties perfected the religious divorce
document therein, acquired contrary to New York's judicial proceedings constitution, by
forwarding the document to the wife in Pakistan.
1996]
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1. What Constitutes "Proceedings" Under the Family Law Act?
Although, the Family Law Act provides no definition as to
what processes constitute "proceedings," English common law,
developed prior to the act, does give guidance. Various courts
considered the matter in relation to the. barP talaq, the ordinance
talaq, and the Jewish get.59
The House of Lords-m Quazv v. Quazi6' held that a divorce
obtained by talaq in Pakistan, which complied with the procedural
requirements of the Pakistan Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of
1961, was a divorce obtained by "judicial or other proceedings.",61
In determinng the validity of the bare talaq, Justice Bush in Zaal
v. Zaal found such a process also fell within the criterion of "other
proceedings," 62 whereas Justice Wood in Sharif v. Sharif came to
a contrary conclusion.' The Court of Appeal resolved the
conflict in Chaudhary v. Chaudhary6 The husband in Chaudhary
returned to Kashmir, where a bare talaq itself constitutes a valid
divorce, to dissolve the marital ties.6 The court categorically
rejected the husband's proposition that this constituted
"proceedings." In order to be recognized as "other proceedings,"
the parties must obtain a foreign divorce by means that constitute
more than a mere unilateral or consensual act of either or both
parties to the mamage, regardless of how formal or solemn the act
was or what ritual or ceremony accompamed .t. 66 Lord Justice
Oliver stated "[t]he word must import a degree of formality and at
least the involvement of some agency, whether lay or religious, of
or recognised by the state having a function that is more than
simply probative 9)67 The bare talaq is the private act of one
59. For cases involving a bare talaq, see Zaal v. Zaal,- [1983] 3 F.L.R. 284; Sharif v.
Sharif, [1980] 10 Faro. 216; Chaudhary v. Chaudhary, [1984] 3 All E.R. 1017 The
ordinance talaq was involved in Quazi v. Quazi, [1979] 3 All E.R. 897 (appeal taken'from
Eng. C.A.). For examples of cases involving divorces by get, see Broit v. Broit, 1972 SCOTS
L. TIMES 32; Maples v. Maples, [1987] 3 All E.R. 188 (Far. Div.); Berkovits v. Grinberg,
[1995] 2 All E.R. 681 (Farn. Div.).
60. [1979] 3 All E.R. at 897.
61. Id. at 897-98.
62. [1983] 3 F.L.R. at 287.
63. [1980] 10 Fam. 216, 217.
64. [1984] 3 All E.R. 1017.
65. Id. at 1022.
66. Id. at 1030.
67. Id. at 1031 (Lord Justice Oliver).
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party and lacks outside involvement. Unlike the ordinance talaq,
courts do not recognize a bare talaq as "other proceedings"
because it is no more than a unilateral pronouncement and does
not involve the machinery of the state.
Courts equate the ordinance talaq, with outside religious
involvement and official state recogmtion, as "other
proceedings."'' The Jewish get bears obvious similarities, and m
fact requires greater formalities such as a precise legal document
and the Rabbimcal Court's involvement. Not surprisingly, the
courts have recognized the get as constituting "other proceedings."
In Broit v. Broit, the Israeli religious court m Haifa found the
Israeli divorce consequential to the get document and receipt in
Israel by the wife.6 9 Lord Fraser stated quite categorically that "it
was abundantly clear that the Israeli divorce fell within the words,
'other proceedings. '"'70 Maples v. Maples later confirmed this
approach."
The conclusion that a get amounts to "other proceedings" is
significant when applied to more recent cases such as Berkovits v.
Grinberg.' The wife m Berkovits was clearly an Israeli national,
and the get divorce was effective in Israel. The final hurdle for the
husband, however, involved the problem of transnational
proceedings: a get written in London but delivered in Israel."'
2. Where is a Divorce "Obtained" in Transnational
Proceedings?
The Berkovits decision represents the first time English courts
have addressed the important issue of recognizing transnational
divorces under the Family Law Act. 4 Prior to the Family Law
Act, courts based their analyses on the statutory wording of the
Recogmtion of Divorces and. Legal Separations Act of 1971 and
the Domcile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act of 1973."
68. Family Law Act, supra note 5, § 46(2).
69. 1972 S.LT. 32.
70. Id. at 33.
71. [1987] 3 All E.R. 188 (Fain. Div.).
72. [1995] 2 All E.R. 681 (Fain. Div.). See infra part III.C. (discussing the Berkovits
decision).
73. Berkovits, [1995] 2 All E.R. at 684.
74. Id
75. Id., Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971, supra note 44, § 3
stated: "(1) The validity of an overseas divorce or legal separation shall be recognised if,
at the date of the institution of the proceedings in the country in which it was obtained -(a)
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Although the Family Law Act replaced these statutes, it is
instructive to examine the reasoning of the two main cases, Fatima
v. Secretary of State76 and Maples v. Maples,"7 under the old
statutory regime.
In Fatima, the transnational divorce involved an ordinance
talaq procedure.78 The husband, a Pakistani national and Muslim
who lived in England, wished to divorce his wife, who was living in
Pakistan. In 1978, he pronounced the talaq in England and made
a statutory declaration to that effect to an English solicitor.
Subsequently, as required under the Pakistan Muslim Family Law
Ordinance, his wife and the chairman of the relevant union council
in Pakistan received notice and, under Pakistani law, the mamage
dissolved ninety days later.79  The ordinance talaq, i too,
constitutes "other proceedings."' s In 1982, the husband wished to
marry Ghulam Fatima, but an immigration officer refused her entry
to England because England did not recognize the husband's talaq
divorce. The appellant, the husband's fiancee, sought judicial
review. The issue before the House of Lords was where the
husband obtained the divorce.8'
Lord Ackner, with whom the other Lordships agreed, held
that the husband's pronouncement of the talaq in England was the
first step in, and therefore the initiation of, the proceedings of his
talaq divorce and constituted part of those divorce proceedings.
The court held "[t]he proceedings had taken place partly in
England and partly in Pakistan."' This obviously was contrary
to the appellant's view that the proceedings had taken place wholly
in Pakistan.' Lord Ackner cited as a prerequisite to recogmzmg
a divorce that there be "a single set of proceedings which have to
be instituted in the same country as that in which the relevant
divorce was ultimately obtamed."'
either spouse was habitually resident m that country; or (b) either spouse was a national
of. that country." Id.
76. [1986] 2 All E.R. 32 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
77. [1987] 3 All E.R. 188 (Faro. Div.).
78. [1986] 2 All E.R. at 32.
79. lit at 34.
80. Quazi v. Quazi, [1979] 3 All E.R. 897 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
.81. Fatima, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 33-34.
82. Id. at 35.
83. Id. at 32.
84. Id. at 36.
85. i (emphasis added).
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The Fatima court also relied on policy rationale. Pursuant to
section 16(1) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act,
s6
no proceedings in England validly dissolved i marriage unless
instituted in a competent court.87 Lord Ackner stressed that it
was the policy of the legislature to deny recognition of divorces
that persons obtain within the jurisdiction, and therefore subject to
the laws of England, by any proceedings other than m an English
courtm Recognizing, and thereby encouraging, divorces by the
talaq procedure obtained through the mail by Pakistani nationals
residing in England is contrary to that policy.8 9  Temtorial
sovereignty applies to any part of the divorce process instituted
within the forum. $
The court in Maples v. Maples' adopted a similar approach
to transnational divorce. In Maples, the husband agreed to a
Jewish get divorce but not to an English civil divorce. An English
civil divorce required making various allegations, which neither
party wished to make against the other.9' In accordance with
requisite Jewish formalities at the Beth Din in London, the
husband granted, and the wife accepted, a get by which both
parties acknowledged the dissolution of their marriage in Haifa.
The District Court of Haifa subsequently issued a judgment of
confirmation of the get obtained m London. The Maples court,
however, irrespective of the Israeli confirmation, held that the
granting by the husband of the get, and the wife's acceptance
thereof, at the Beth Din in London, effectively and finally dissolved
their marriage only according to Israeli law.92 Under English law,
these acts constituted an extra-judicial proceeding not entitled to
recognition because a competent civil court did not grant the
divorce. The effect was to create a limping marriage, recogmzed
as validly dissolved in Israel but not in England.93
86. Domicile and Matnmonial Proceedings Act, 1973, ch. 45, § 16(i) (replaced by
Family Law Act, ch. 55, § 44).
87. Domicile and Matnmonial Proceedings Act, supra note 86, § 16(1). This section
reversed the effect of the decision in Qureshl v. Qureshi, 1972 Fain. 173. In Qureshl, the
court recognized the full talaq proceedings which took place wholly within England
between Pakistani domicilianes under the lex domtcilii pnnciple. Id.
88. Faruna, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 36.
89. Id. at 36.
90. [1987] 3 All E.R. 188 (Fam. Div.).
91. Id. at 190.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 192.
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The reasomng of Lord Ackner in Fatima, as applied to the
statutory wording of the Recognition of 'Divorces and Legal
Separations Act, has been directly applied to the slightly different
wording contained within the Family Law Act. Courts have held
that the "date of the commencement of the proceedings" contained
within the Family Law Act must refer to one set of proceedings
instituted in the country in which the parties obtain the divorce.94
The proceedings should be geographically connected, not only to
the place where the parties obtained the divorce, but to the place
where they instituted the proceedings.
C. The Berkovits v. Gnnberg Decision
The recent English decision in Berkovits v. Grnberg95 has
important ramifications for members of the Jewish community, and
also has consequential implications for Muslims. The issue before
Justice Wall. in -the Family Divisional Court was the recoghition of
a transnational divorce by a get under the Family Law Act.96 In
Berkovits, part of the divorce proceedings took place in England
and part took place in Israel.97 Israeli law recognizes a Jewish
religious divorce by the get process; if, however, England refuses to
recognize a divorce, the parties are caught in a limping marriage."
The confusion, inequity, and uncertainty over such limping
marriages results in "acute misery and frustration." 99 Legislation
in this area attempted to cure this very dilemma."° Regrettably,
despite two genuine .attempts at statutory reform, inequities still
persist.
B'erkovits v. Grnberg came before the court in a rather
unusual way.'0 ' The petitioner was the rabbi who served as a
judge of the Beth Din."2 The husband was not a party m the
court proceedings. The Federation of Synagogues authorized
94. Family Law Act, supra note 5, § 46(3)(a).
95. [1995] 2 All E.R. 681 (Fain. Div.).
96. Family Law Act, supra note 5.
97. [1995] 2 All E.R. at 684.
98. Id. at 683.
99. Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Bill, 315 HANSARD (H.L.) (Feb. 16,
1971).
100. Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971, ch. 53 (Eng.); Family
Law Act, 1986, eh. 55 (Eng.); Matrimonial and Proceedings Act, 1984, ch. 42 (Eng.).
101. [19951 2 All E.R. at 683.
102. The Beth Din is the court for members of the Jewish community wishing to adhere
to Jewish law. Id. at 688.
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marriages between Jewish couples. Before such a marriage can
take place, there must be written authorization that the parties
satisfy all requirements under Jewish law, that there is no impedi-
ment to the marriage under English law, and that the parties have
obtained the requisite certificate from the local registrar. 3 In
November 1992, the rabbi received a letter from the husband
applying to marry for the second time and supplying details of his
previous marriage and its termination by a get in Israel. 4 The
husband obtained a get, which was written in London under Jewish
ecclesiastical law and delivered to the wife at the District Rabbmi-
cal Court at Natanga, Israel, on June 14, 1988. This get was
effective as a divorce decree under the law of the State of Israel.
Pursuant to section 55 of the Family Law Act, the rabbi applied to
the court for a declaration that the divorce was valid under English
law. 05
The get, albeit a religious-not civil--divorce process, requires
a great degree of formality. The mutual agreement of both parties
is a prerequisite, unlike the Moslem talaq.1' The get is a written
document and cannot be pronounced orally. A trained scribe takes
three hours or longer to complete the get m Hebrew and Aramaic.
The get is executed m the Beth Din in the presence of three
dayans, judges expert in family law matters. Two. competent
witnesses, specifically appointed for that particular purpose, sign
the document. The wife must receive the get m person. The
103. Id. at 683.
104. Id.
.105. Id., Family Law Act, supra note 5, § 55 entitled "Declaration as to marital status"
provides in part:
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, any person may apply to
the court for one or more of the following declarations in relation to a marriage
specified in the application, that is to say-
(d) a declaration that the validity of a divorce, annulment or legal separation
obtained in any country outside England and Wales in respect of the marriage is
entitled to recognition in England and Wales,
(3) where an application under subsection (1) above is made by any person other
than a party to the marriage to which the application relates, the court shall
refuse to hear the application if it considers that the applicant does not have a
sufficient interest in the deterrmnation of the application.
Id.
The court took the view that the rabbi petitioner did not have sufficient statusto seek
a declaration under the above provision. Berkovits, [1995] 2 All E.R. 681 (Fain. Div.).
106. Although today the get requires mutual consent, technically it is still the husband
who acts to prepare the document.
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crucial legal act that dissolves the marital ties is handing the get to
the wife.0 7 In Israel, no civil divorce exists, only the religious
form of divorce by the get process is available. Where, as m
Berkovits, the parties reside in different countries, the respective
Beth Din courts must exchange the formal get and hand the
document over to the wife in the usual manner in front of two
witnesses and in the presence of three judges of the Beth Din.'08
Contrary to the rabbi's position, the court in Berkovits
determined that obtaining a divorce by means of proceedings
denoted
a process rather than a single act. To obtain a divorce a party
must go through a process, in the same way that a person
obtains a university degree or any other qualification. If that
process is part of a judicial process (proceedings) and therefore
linked to one judicial authority there is logic and sense in
saying that the proceedings must begin and end in the same
place."
Accordingly, the mere fact that the parties "obtain" a divorce, in
the sense that the divorce is "finalized" or "pronounced" m one
country, cannot dissociate the process of "obtaining" it from the
proceedings and, therefore, the country in which it was ob-
tained."0
The Berkovits court would not recognize the transnational
Jewish get as validly dissolving the marital bond because the parties
obtained the get partly in England, where the writing of the
document was- a critical step in the proceedings, and partly in
Israel, where delivery of the get actually dissolved the mamage.",
The divorce decree was effective under the Israeli law, but was not
recognized in England, and thus created a limping marriage.
D. Application Under U.S. Law
US. courts have reached the same conclusions as English
courts, 112 as demonstrated by the decison in Chertok v.
107. See THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES BOOK FOUR, THE BOOK OF WOMEN 166 (Isaac
Klein trans., 1972); see also Berkovits, [1995] 2 All E.R. at 688.
108. Thus, the get cannot be sent to her in the post; "divorce by post" is a legal impos-
sibility in Jewish law.
109. Berkovas, 11995) 2 All E.R. at 694.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 681-82.
112. EUGENE F SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 524 (2d ed. 1982).
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Chertok."3 The parties were Russian nationals who marred m
1910 m Russia (the lex loci celebrationts),"' but -who became
domiciled in New York around 1912. The couple then visited a
rabbi in New York to procure a rabbimcal divorce. The parties
prepared the get document and consummated the divorce in Russia
according to rabbimcal laws that the government of Russia
recognized." 5 The New York Constitution prohibited divorce
granted other than by due judicial proceedings.'1 6  The court
held that the writing, purporting to be a divorce that the rabbi in
Brooklyn granted, had no effect m the forum and was not valid as
a result of the consummation m Russia. Although the parties
perfected the rabbinical divorce m Russia, the court regarded the
divorce's inception to be when the Brooklyn rabbi issued the get
document; therefore, the divorce was void at its inception under
the law of the forum. The proceedings were not consonant with
prevailing New York law and, thus, created a limping marriage; a
mamage valid in New York but dissolved in Russia." 7
A parallel exists between the prevailing principles applied by
both English and U.S. authorities to transnational non-judicial
divorces. Temtonal sovereignty and judicial process requirements
reign supreme despite the creation of limping marriages. In light
of policy considerations, does a rational justification exist?
IV POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
It is evident that the refusal to. recognize transnational divorce
by ordinance talaq, as in Fatima"' and Shikoh,"9 or by Jewish
get, as in Berkovitsn ° and Chertok,12 ' has far-reaching implica-
tions for Jewish, Muslim, and other commumties that grant non-
judicial divorce." The Law Commission noted that the court is
113. 203 N.Y.S. 163 (App. Div. 1924).
114. Lex loci celebrationis is defined as "the law of the place where the contract was
made." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (6th ed. 1990).
115. Chertok, 203 N.Y.S. at 164.
116. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 9., see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1450 (containing this same
prohibition).
117. Chertok, 203 N.Y.S. at 164.
118. [1986] 2 All E.R. 32 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
119. 257 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1958).
120. [1995] 2 All E.R. 681 (Fain. Div.).
121. 203 N.Y.S. at 163.
122. The unfortunate consequences exacerbate prevailing agunah difficulties for Jewish
women. It was estimated that more than 15,000 orthodox Jewish women in New York
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not the only entity that determines the validity of a foreign
divorce." "For example, British immigration officials abroad
and in the United Kingdom, officials concerned with nationality,
passport, income tax or social security matters, registrars of
marriages, and indeed trustees or personal representatives. may
from time to time need to determine the. [the validity of a divorce]
issue."124 Their task would be easier if the law were certain, fair,
and easier to ascertain. Present law, however, fails on a number of
different levels.
A. Recognizing a "Divorce" as Effective Unless Policy
Requirements Supervene
The Hague Convention,"z which preceded the English
statutory recognition regime of 1971, introduced a more liberal
approach into this area of the law. In the view of the Law
Conussion that reported on the Convention: "[olur courts
recognise any divorce, whatever the form, method or grounds,
provided that the court in the State of origin has jurisdiction in our
eyes. It would be a retrograde step to resile from this."'26
Clearly, the refusal to recognize transnational divorces because
one element of .the overall. proceedings occurs in England or the
United States is in stark contrast to the liberal regime suggested by
the Hague Convention. Rather than continuing.the current English
or U.S. approach, a better solution is recognizing a "divorce" that
effectively dissolves the marital ties by the overseas country unless
important public policy considerations intervene.
Academics review the current policy of refusing to recognize
the transnational divorce with singular disfavor.lV These aca-
demics suggest instead that the parties "obtain" a transnational
alone were in this state of marital limbo--cvilly divorced but unable to obtain a get. See
IRVIN H. HALuT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW'AND LIFE 101 (1983).
123. LAW COMMISSION AND SColTiSH LAW COMMISSION, No. 137, 1984, CMND. 9341,
at 3.
124. Id.
125. Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separation (Hague XVIII),
June 1, 1970, art. 17, 1975 U.K.T.S. 123 (Cmnd. 6248).
126. LAW COMMISSION AND THE SCoTTiSH LAW COMMISSION, 1970, CMND. 4542, at
8 (report on the Hague Convention's Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separation of
1970).
127. See Pilkington, supra note 46; Transnational Divorces, supra note 32; Chnstopher
Forsyth, Recognition of Extra-Judicial Divorces: The Transnational Divcrce, 34 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 398 (1985).
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divorce where the parties complete the process of divorce, so that
the talaq or get procedure becomes operative." Hence, these
academics find that the crucial factor is where the parties perfect
the divorce, not where the parties pronounce the divorce.29
Applying the academics' approach to the facts in
Berkovits, 30 the get divorce was effected in Israel as delivery to
the wife causally perfected the dissolution, not with the mere
writing of the document itself. The parties obtained the get by the
proceedings m Israel-the delivery to the wife-not by subsidiary
events which transpired in England.'31 This approach would
differentiate between the ordinance talaq and get processes.
Although the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance requires further
conditions, 32 the pronouncement of the talaq ultimately dissolves
the mamage. Hence, the position that the talaq itself constitutes
part of the relevant proceedings is formally sound" This is not
true of the get process, where the relevant part of the proceedings
is the actual delivery of the get to the wife. Based on this analysis,
the courts should have recognized the non-judicial get divorces m
Berkovitst and Chertok'35 because they were "obtained" in
Israel.
128. Pilkmgton, supra note 46; Transnauonal Divorces, supra note 32; Forsyth, supra
note 127.
129. Pilkington, supra note 46, at 135.
130. [1995] 2 All E.R. 681 (Fam. Div.).
131. Transnauonal Divorces, supra note 32, at 91. The delineation made is that the
writing of the get document is merely a preparatory stage in the chain of events ultimately
leading to divorce-an essential step, indeed, and subject to very considerable -legal
conditions and prescnptions-but nonetheless only a preparatory step. The mere writing
of the document per, se has no legal effect whatsoever in terms of dissolving the marital
ties. If the document is not handed to the wife, in the presence of the required witnesses
and court, then the transaction will be of absolutely no effect. When the document is
properly handed over to the wife, it is that act of physical transfer that is the sole element
constituting the divorce. It is not that the initial writing of the document subsequently
takes effect; it is the hand-over of the document that dissolves the mamage. Ie.
132. See Fatima v. Secretary of State, [1986] 2 All E.R. 34 (appeal taken from Eng.
C.A.) (citing the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961).
133. Lucy Carroll, A Talaq Pronounced m England is not an "Overseas Divorce," 101
L. Q. REv 175, 176 (1985), stating:
[Tihe talaq pronouncement is the only proceedings involved in the
'proceedings' leading to a talaq divorce effective under the Muslim Family Law
Ordinance which actually can and does dissolve the matrimonial bond; no other
act or action or event or happening that occurs subsequently to the pronoun-
cement of the ralaq formula has the power of dissolving the marriage.
Id.
134. [1995] 2 All E.R. at 681.
135. 203 N.Y.S. 163 (N.Y. App. Div. 1924).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
The clear policy of the English legislature to refuse recognition
to non-judicial divorces that parties obtain within England reflects
a legislative retreat from the decision in Qureshi v. Quresh, 3 6
where the court recogmzed a bare talaq divorce in England. In
Qureshi, the divorce was effective in accordance with the law of the
parties' Pakistani domicile.37 It seems logical that the lex fo-
ri138 alone determines the'incidents of entire "proceedings" within
the jurisdiction which purportedly breaks the marage bond. This
argument is not as persuasive, however, when applied in a
transnational context to a non-judicial divorce perfected in the
foreign jurisdiction.
B. The Importance of the Maiimonial and Family Proceedings
Act of 1984
Prior to 1985, under English conflict of law rules, a party who
received a dissolution or annulment of their marriage outside
England could not obtain matrimomal relief from an English court.
Such relief was available only if there was a valid subsisting
marriage and either party petitioned in England for divorce or
sought financial provision as a result of failure to maintain. The
consequence of this harsh scenario was that a wife had to petition
English courts for a divorce, request that the English court not
recogmze the divorce obtained abroad by her husband (usually by
non-proceeding or non-judicial means), and thus find that a valid,
subsisting mamage existed. The spouses did not wish to remain
married; rather, the central issue was whether the wife could force
her husband to support her.
Where foreign proceedings terminated the marriage and did
not include a financial order, a gap in the law existed because
English courts had no power to grant financial relief in such a case.
In Quazv v. Quazv,39 Lord Scarman expressed the hope that the
Law Commission would look into this anomaly. Following the Law
Commission's report, Part III of the Matrimomal and Family
Proceedings Act of: 1984, rectified this gap."4 The availability of
136. 1972 Faro. 173, 195.
137. Id. at 199.
138. Lexfori is defined as "the law of the forum." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 910 (6th
ed. 1990).
139. [1979] 3 All E.R. 897, 912 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
140. LAW COMMISSION, No. 117, 1982, at 110-11 (Family Law Financial Relief After
Foreign Divorce); Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act, 1984 ch. 42 actually came into
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financial provision in England to persons receiving an overseas
divorce is a vitally important consideration when examining current
transnational divorce recogmtion rules.
In light of financial provision concerns, what then is the
correct policy to adopt? In Chaudhary v. Chaudhary,"4' the court
suggested that public policy should prevent England's recogmtion
of a non-judicial overseas divorce when both parties had an English
domicile.'42 Lord Justice Oliver stressed that:
it must plainly be contrary to the policy of the law in a case
where both parties to a mamage are domiciled m this country
to permit one of them, while continuing his English domicile, to
avoid the incidents of his dormciliary law and to deprive the
other party to the marriage of her rights under that law by the
simple process of taking advantage of his financial ability to
travel to a country whose laws appear temporarily to be more
favourable to him.43
Chaudhary involved a bare talaq, which today the courts do
not recogmze because of the domicile jurisdictional requirements
contained within the Family Law Act.'" Nevertheless, prior to
the Family Law Act, a party with financial means could obtain an
ordinance talaq in the overseas country; alternatively, in the Jewish
divorce context, one party could write a get in England and deliver
the document to the other party in the overseas country. Similarly,
a talaq pronounced in England could be effected in Pakistan by
force on September 16, 1985; The ambit of the statute has been recently interpreted by the
Court of Appeal in Hewitson v. Hewitson, [1995] 1 F.L.R. 241. The court, led by Lord
Justice Butler-Sloss, unanimously held that if a wife received a final order by a California
court, she cannot thereafter be given leave to apply for relief under § 13 of the Act. This
is notwithstanding a temporary resumption of cohabitation with her husband in England
after the divorce. It would be inconsistent with comity existing between courts of
comparable jurisdiction for an English court to review, or seek to supplement, the foreign
order on the basis of the subsequent relationship of former spouses. Litigation must have
finality. The statute applies prima facie where a final binding financial settlement has not
been negotiated within the foreign territory.. Id.
An interesting postscript to the Hewitson case is that, prior to the mamage, the parties
entered into an ante-nuptial mamage agreement m California. The husband, a millionaire,
was concerned about the liberal California community property regime. As events
transpired, it would have been prudent for the wife not to have entered such a contract.
It was not for the English courts, by means of the 1984 Act, to mend a bad contractual
bargain, and it would have been surprising if they had done so. Id
141. [1984] 3 All E.R. 1017.
142. Id. at 1024.
143. Id. at 1033.
144. See NORTH & FAwcErr, supra note 55, at 684.
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fulfilling the requirement of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance.
In each scenario, the public policy for denying recognition of these
overseas divorces was predicated on a desire to provide financial
provision to the wife following an overseas divorce. Following the
amendments contained in the Matrimorual and Family Proceedings
Act of 1984, this policy is no longer valid.'45 Under section 12(1)
of the act, parties must dissolve the marriage overseas by means of
"judicial or other proceedings."'"6 Courts determined that both
the ordinance talaq and the Jewish get constitute "other
proceedings.'
147
The preferred solution in the case of transnational divorces is
to acknowledge the process as perfected m the foreign countiy, but
to allow the wife to recover -financial provision m England in
accordance with the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act of
1984. That should have been the outcome in Berkovits, where the
husband effected the divorce in Israel by the delivery of the get to
the wife.'" In the converse situation, courts should not recognize
a divorce where the husband writes the get document in Israel but
the wife receives it in England. In that scenario, the parties perfect
the divorce in England, and, therefore, a court of competent civil
jurisdiction cannot recognize it given the entrenched conflicts policy
rule of dissolution.
C. Non-Judicial Divorce Recognition Based on International
Comity
Even foreign divorce decrees by means of judicial proceedings
are not accorded the "Full Faith and Credit" of U.S. domestic
law.'49 The most important question U.S. courts must address is
whether the foreign court had junsdiction. 50 A similar junsdic-
tional inquiry is only pertinent in the domestic interstate setting
where the out-of-state divorce was ex parte. Inter partes divorces,
where both parties participate in the proceeding, however, preclude
a collateral attack under the principles as outlined in the cases of
145. The legislation, however, limited its aim. Encouraging applications to English
courts to act, in effect, as courts of appeal from courts of another country. is not
appropriate.
146. Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act, supra note 100, § 12(1).
147. Id.
148. [1995] 2 All E.R. 681 (Fain. Div.).




Sherrer v. Sherrer,'5 ' Coe v. Coe,'5 and Cook v. Cook.153
Because a party had the opportunity to challenge jurisdiction
before the initial forum state, she is estopped from raising
jurisdictional objections. The landmark decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel," however, extended
recognition ascribed to inter partes divorces to a foreign context
where U.S. donuciliaries traveled consensually to that town.
In Rosenstiel, the parties deliberately traveled from New York
to Mexico to acquire an inter partes divorce, taking advantage of
the easy jurisdictional requirements, which included the signing of
the municipal register and a divorce obtained on local grounds
within a period as short as twenty-four hours. The New York
Court of Appeals recognized this Mexican divorce. The court
stated quite categorically that
[t]he state or country of true domicile has the closest real public
interest in a marriage but, where a New York spouse goes
elsewhere to establish a synthetic domicile to meet technical
acceptance of a matrimonial suit, our public interest is not
affected differently by a short residential formality than by a
larger one.155
Balanced public policy required that courts recognize bilateral
divorces.
The Rosenstiel decision is restricted to consensual foreign
judicial divorces acquired by U.S. domicilianes.'56 The underly-
ing premise, however, directly relates to the correct path that both
U.S. and English courts ought to follow regarding transnational,
non-judicial divorces. The Rosenstiel court was prepared to
recognize a foreign divorce provided, as a matter of coimty, it did
not offend the public policy of the forum."5  This approach
shows a paramount concern to avoid the deleterious consequences
of limping marriages. By an ex silentio argument derived from
Rosenstiel, a U.S. court should recognize a Jewish divorce by a get
where the document is delivered formally to the wife within the
overseas jurisdiction perfecting the divorce. International conuty
151. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
152. 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
153. 342 U.S. 126 (1951). See generally supra note 1.
154. 209 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1965).
155. Id. at 712. Note a powerful dissenting opinion by Justice Scileppi. Id. at 715.
156. I&
157. Id. at 713.
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requires that courts adopt a wider perspective over concomitant
obligations and demonstrate a greater understanding of the get and
talaq processes.5 8 The concept of international conuty is rather
nebulous, but the reference of the U.S. Supreme Court m Hilton
v. Guyot remains the best description: -
[It is] neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its temtory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws159
It is self-evident that the means by which a foreign court
system implements and enforces its orders does not have -to
emulate the English or U.S. systems. Axiomatically, equitable
results over family law matters should be the basis for prevailing
comity between countries.
V CONCLUSION
The current state of the law, denying recogmtion to all
transnational divorces, is wholly regrettable. It is the apotheosis of
absurdity to unilaterally deny recogmtion where any element of the
total proceedings takes place in the forum. In Berkovits, the court
ignored the fact that only the actual physical delivery of the
document to the wife perfected the Jewish get, an event which took
place completely within Israeli jurisdiction, and that Israel regarded
the divorce as effective. The current approach shows no regard for
the egregious financial implications involved. A wealthy spouse
able to travel to Israel can achieve marital dissolution, whereas a
financially debilitated spouse, where the other party is abroad,
cannot obtain a religious divorce in accordance with the tenets of
a faith he has followed throughout ins life. Tus is neither
158. It is helpful to bear in mind the statement of Lord Penzane, which courts in
England and in the United States quote extensively:
different communities have different views and laws respecting matrimonial
obligations, and a different estimate of the causes which should justify divorce.
It is both just and reasonable, therefore, that the differences of married people
should be adjusted in accordance with the laws of the community to which they
belong, and dealt with by the tribunals which alone can administer those laws.
Wilson v. Wilson, 2 L.R.-P & D. 435, 442 (1872).
159. 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1894).
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equitable nor justifiable. The courts create limping marriages,
which benefit no one. Also, a grave danger exists that the wife,
forced to obtain civil divorce but also impelled by religious
considerations to undergo a second religious ceremony, is open to
blackmail by the husband, resulting in a seriously detrimental
financial settlement for the wife.' 60
Courts also ignore cultural differences followed by members
of the Jewish and Muslim communities.'6' Imposing uniform
western principles is inappropriate and shows a failure to recognize
the bigger picture involved here. A further policy issue, however,
is at stake. The current approach is untenable because its ultimate
outcome, as demonstrated by cases such as Berkovits, is a limping
marriage and consequential "acute misery and frustration."
Because such problems result from the current processes that deny
recognition to all transnational divorces where an element in the
process transpires in England or the Umted States, an urgent need
exists for statutory legislation to cure the current lacuna.
160. Breitowitz, supra note 22, at 318-19.
161. See Quazi v. Quaz, 1980 App. Cas. 744, where Justice Wood stated most
appropriately, that "it is important that the courts m this jurisdiction should appreciate that
we have living in our community persons who have a religion different from those with
which we are familiar and with its own particular devout customs, obligations and rights."
let at 782.
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